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The union, as Chief Justice George Edwards Jr. explained in his opinion for the court, "attempted to demonstrate profitability by defining minimum profitability as the 'gross profit margin.' " In other words, this meant "the revenues minus variable costs of performing the operation to produce the product." By this profit metric-an operating ratio-the Youngstown mills had turned a profit of $32,571,000 in 1979. The projected profit for 1980, when the mill was closed, was $32,396,000.
But as Justice Edwards continued, "with a different definition of profit," the "outcome of an accounting analysis could be made to be nonprofitability." William R. Roesch, president and chief operating officer (COO) of U.S. Steel, and David Roderick, the chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer, had objected to the steelworkers' calculations. They did not account for historical fixed costs, namely, the fixed costs over time of maintaining the mills, whose obsolescence was the very reason they were being shuttered. Roesch explained:
"There are other factors involved . . . you have to subtract the depreciation for the equipment which was involved and depreciate it over a period of time; you have to subtract the selling expenses which are necessary; and you have to subtract the administrative charges, the taxes, and so forth." All these factors were taken into account in the corporation's preferred profit metric, the rate of return on capital invested. CEO Roderick added that in light of this particular metric, according to his "best judgment," the mills were operating at a loss. There was nothing that could be done to reverse the trend. Hence the mills had to be closed.
In his decision, Justice Edwards admitted that profit had revealed itself to be a matter of "interpretation." Profit, the judge realized, is no obvious, neutral, or timeless economic benchmark. Rather, it is a calculative practice open to interpretation. Edwards was still loath to exchange an interpretation of "the parameters of profitability for that of the corporation." Corporations decide what profit is. The Youngstown mills joined the more than one thousand factories in the United
States that closed during the 1970s, along with many others in the Western industrial core.
2 With aging capital stock, aging organized labor, and rising international competition, so it went, these mills were simply not "profitable."
The 1970s collapse of manufacturing profits in the West is a familiar drama, spelling the end of capitalism's postwar Golden Age, the exhaustion of the Ford- If I own a fork, for example, and record its existence on a piece of paper-"fork"-I have created a record of wealth. If I own a factory and record its money value on one piece of paper, while recording a separate profit and loss statement concerning its operations on another, I am accounting for my factory as a form of capital, not merely recording it as a form of wealth. An eye toward the next profit and loss statement compels me to continue to do so-to continue to think of my factory as capital, and nothing more. 9 The tautologies reflect the circular character of value creation under capitalism. The changing meanings of profit, however, tell us that this tautology has a history.
Wealth, taking the form of capital or not, demands an adding up calculation, a momentary capture. Wealth, in principle, can be a static category, a mere "stock" of things that people, for whatever reason, value-in monetary terms or not.
Profit, however, always concerns a "flow," a process, and a rate over time. Capital therefore has not only a monetary but also a temporal dimension that wealth does not necessarily possess. No doubt, accounting furthers the illusion that capital is an essentially quantitative phenomenon, an independent "factor of production." But the profit rate does quantitatively express capital's inherent temporality. Or to say the same thing in another way, without profit capital ceases to be capital and reverts back to wealth. And so to account for profit, then, must be to narrate a history of capital.
Profit metrics have the following charges under capitalism. Profit is, as commonly thought, both a medium of competition and a category of distribution. 10 Nonetheless, transforming wealth into capital, preventing it from reverting back, profit also quantitatively organizes capital's temporal motion. That demands shifting attention away from "the market" and to the broader historical dynamics of capital and wealth. The history of profit concerns the temporal histories of the concrete forms that capital (so abstract in the accounts) takesand from which capitalists attempt, often but not always through market activity, to define and make profit. This history of forms of capital includes the biological life cycle of the African-American slave, the rusting obsolescence of the Ohio steel mill, or the debt-financed digital "special purpose entity" of contemporary global financial markets. Profit regimes, that is, take shape in the following reciprocal en-counter: between the abstractions of capital in the accounts and the concrete embodiments of capital and wealth on the ground. That encounter is material, cognitive, and ideological. Since accounting entails accountability, it is also social.
Further-given the historical appearance of the profit motive, when profit became simultaneously an object of measurement and longing-it is also psychological.
Lines of influence-between changing forms of capital and changing calculative practices-run in both directions. Profit paradigms have the power to alter the structural conditions of capitalism, I hope to demonstrate, as they themselves emerge from the structural possibilities at stake in any given moment of capitalism's history, given the particular concrete forms of capital, as well as the cognitive orientations that make profiting from them possible.
The limitations of the inquiry-which is schematic, only suggestive of a larger study given the subject's scope-will be evident. Presenting profit's long arc sacrifices depth, as well as adequate attention to turning points in profit's history. Ultimately the focus will be on the history of corporations (for profit and nonprofit). But I can only gesture toward profit's many historical contexts and the connections between them across economic, moral, legal, cultural, intellectual, organizational, and political fields, as well as toward the different frames of analysis necessary to make sense of them. And while I acknowledge transnational, comparative, and global dimensions, I draw mostly from the history of the United States-although I suspect that, if not the exact periodization and content, both the rough sequence and the problems at hand are of broader interest and relevance.
Nevertheless, there are insights to be gleaned from profit's longue duré e, and the history of profit assembled here, with its focus on temporality, might open up new sightlines on the history of capitalism. It also indicates that we are still living in the midst of another great inflection point in profit's history, the same moment opened up by the Western industrial crisis of the 1970s. Today, the future of profit, the future history of capital, is very much up for grabs.
THE BALANCE OF INCOME AND OUTGO
In the United States, for well into the nineteenth century, in accounting terms profit meant the balance of commercial income and outgo. This was a mercantile standard, a product of the early modern double-entry bookkeeping revolution. It made it possible for economic actors-should they need or wish-to assess their external transactions with the outside commercial world. Generally speaking this was an era in which profit calculations and motives were often conflated with a variety of other calculations and motives-to accumulate wealth, or to assess levels of credit and debt. Early modern accounts told episodic histories of commerce, debt, and wealth in which profit was not always an end in and of itself. Therefore, these were histories in which capital-struggling to transform wealth-still struggled to assert it its own independent temporality as sovereign in economic life.
In theory, as Weber, Sombart, and Schumpeter emphasized, double-entry bookkeeping made possible the separation of the profit and loss statement from the capital account, or the transformation of wealth into profit-seeking capital. In practice, as scholars of early modern accounting have illustrated, including accounting historians of the early nineteenth-century United Sates, it did not necessarily happen. More than that, not even the external balance of commercial income and outgo was always added up. 12 Many accounts were single entry.
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During the 1830s the US federal government sought to determine the "rate of profit" in manufacturing firms. The McLane Report (1833) revealed that half of the respondents in the survey did not report a rate of profit. 14 Why was all of this so?
Rather than capital/profit, economic actors were more preoccupied with accounting for two other categories. First, they tracked external commercial transactions in order to assess levels of credit and debt. Indebtedness might then lead one to better tend to their profit and loss statements. Second, more closely tracked than capital/profit was productive or consumable wealth-wealth in the long sweep of time being the most consistently recorded economic category of all.
Much wealth in preindustrial economies took the form of land, doubling as both a concrete form of capital and the bedrock of social and political order-the latter perhaps rendering capital/profit accounting unnecessary, if not nonsensical. But with enough wealth at hand, of whatever kind, profit and loss statements might languish. Or, wealth might never take the form of profit-seeking capital at all. To the extent to which motivations can be read off accounts, a wealth motive rather 19 In economic cultures still suspicious of usury, adding up the balance of profit and loss proved not so much "that such and such is the net worth of our business, but rather that such profit is morally legitimate." 20 The temporality of commercial income and outgo was often conflated with sacred time-with a yearning for a metric of the soul's ultimate bottom line. Couper's plantation account books were exquisite and are some of the best to have survived.
Couper had "commenced planting without capital" and "had to go into debt."
"8 per cent compound interest," he told his brother, had been "the real perpetual motion" at work on his plantation. account, the complete transformation of wealth into profit-seeking capital. A new accounting metric, the operating ratio, began to change that. The operating ratio sought to relate external commercial transactions, income and outgo, to internal production costs. Amid industrialization, capital was taking new concrete forms, opening potential room for new calculative practices. Accounts begin to tell not so much mercantile histories of commerce, debt, and wealth, but industrial histories of costs. As entrepreneurs began to measure price-cost ratios in standardized units of time, ever shorter, the profit calculation became less eventful, more abstract.
In practice, the operating ratio began to remove noncapitalist temporalities from profit calculations. Profit might now become an end in and of itself, an object of both quantitative accounting and obsessive entrepreneurial longing-further cementing the transformation of wealth into capital.
Early modern double-entry bookkeeping at least prodded economic actors to think of wealth only as profit-seeking capital. The cognitive effects might translate into business practice. 36 It was no accident that Andrew Carnegie and John D.
Rockefeller Sr. 46. The accountant Alexander Holley accompanied Carnegie from the railroads to the steel, designing many of Carnegie's initial cost practices. mills operated with the most advanced production technologies. In an age of capital accumulation, he always sought to deepen his capital, putting more capital in the hands of the same worker. Steel production was capital-intensive, and
Carnegie practiced "hard driving." He tried to run his mills full blast, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. When his plant ran down, he scrapped it, replacing it with physical capital that produced more steel at less variable cost. Charles
Schwab once speculated about a more efficient design for a fully integrated steelworks, and so Carnegie razed an existing rolling mill that was only three months old. 47 Carnegie was able to do this in part because he was not beholden to outside investors, carrying very little debt, raising very little outside equity. Financing relied on "retained earnings," or profits. Carnegie compulsively deepened his capital, at the expense-his partners and investors sometimes grumbled-of his company's commercial balance of income and outgo. Carnegie, like Rockefeller, bought out the interests of as many partners and stockholders as possible.
48
Both men, to an incredible extent, were accountable only to themselves. And so a new accounting audience appeared-the entrepreneur's own psyche.
Carnegie paid little attention to accounting for the use of capital in the industrial production process. He did not depreciate, that is, his fixed capital-not surprising given how often Carnegie scrapped his plant anyway. Carnegie and Rockefeller focused almost exclusively on product costs. Tend to product costs, and profits-no longer defined as the external balance of commercial relationships with the outside world-would take care of themselves. Carnegie explained the new mind-set, lecturing his managers and foremen: "Show me your costs sheets. It is more interesting to know how well and how cheaply you have done this thing than how much money you have made, because the one is a temporary result, due possibly to special conditions of trade, but the other means a permanency that will go on with the steel works as long as they last." 49 Carnegie's accounts were exacting histories of product costs. For to buy low and sell high in commercial markets was merely to transiently profit from uncontrollable "conditions of trade." Of course, with the expanding and urbanizing continental US economy, conditions of trade were highly favorable. Market demand for steel and oil were vast, and both men expanded output-through economies of scale, scope, and speed-at breakneck pace. 50 When they colluded with or bought out the competition both were often surprised to learn that other firms did not account for their production costs.
Rockefeller often complained that so many a competitor was "ignorant of his costs." 51 They did not know whether or not they were profitable-according to this new criteria. To a surprising extent, in the 1870s and 1880s both men competed only against themselves.
The Carnegie Steel Company adopted many innovative cost accounting techniques. 52 As the firm vertically integrated production, the bookkeeping department attached costs to products using vouchers and note cards. 53 The accounts now held individual workers accountable to daily production targets, tracking out- One cost for the Carnegie Steel Company was purchased hourly labor time.
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The consequences for labor in the Carnegie steel mills have been well documented by labor historians. 57 Carnegie established the 12-hours-a-day, sevenday workweek. His commitment to technological innovation, to raise labor productivity, demanded that he break the power of craft labor at the point of production. But there was also the cruel irony of the operating ratio. Because
Carnegie did not account for capital used in physical plant and machinery, labor costs appeared to him as an incredibly high percentage of his total costs. Labor, to follow the logic of his accounts, would be excluded from reaping benefits from the productivity gains achieved by capital deepening. Much of it was plowed back into the company's operations, to once again become profit-seeking capital.
Carnegie had decided to hold the Carnegie Steel Company accountable to the short-term metric of the operating ratio. It truly was, following Sombart, the "segregation of the business sphere" in the name of profit/capital. 60 Profit was now like a flame emitted from the end of one of Carnegie's blast furnaces, never "it may be that my philanthropy has its root in selfishness?" 66 Carnegie was an avid reader of Spencer. The more Spencer he read, absorbing "the truth of evolution," as he put it, the more he treated his workers as factors of production, rather than human beings. Yet, at the same time, the more profits he transformed into philanthropic wealth, rather than transforming them back into profit-seeking capital. 67 Carnegie began his famous 1889 essay "Wealth" by noting, "The problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth." 68 In the decades after 1850, in corporate charters the private language of "lawful purpose" began to replace "public purpose." Lawful purpose became profit.
Pennsylvania (Carnegie's home state) passed a new general incorporation law in 1874, dividing all of its private corporations into two mutually exclusive categories: "for Profit" and "not for Profit." The for-profit corporation, an accounting project, was and is a legal person that literally personified capital. As profit became distinct and sovereign in the business sphere, it made sense to invent a category of, in effect, everything else under the sun. In the 1870s, the language of "not for profit" began to appear.
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The history of the nonprofit corporate personality parallels that of the for profit. After the Revolution, the activities of charitable corporations were similarly restricted to their charters, according to the stricture of public purpose. Charitable wealth had specific targets. If a banking corporation could not build a railroad because it was more profitable, a corporation chartered to feed the poor could not turn around and tend to the blind simply because doing so might maxi- "to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world"-and for all time.
The Foundation declared in 1918 it was free to distribute philanthropy to anyone acting from "altruistic" motives. However it could do nothing involved in any way with "private profit. ROI calculations, in place at Du Pont by the 1920s, correlated the operating ratio to the actual use of capital. 83 The new notion of "sunk costs," not coincidentally, accompanied the turn to ROI. 84 Industrial corporations continued to monitor these and other costs, as "cost accounting" became a distinct, professionalized field. 85 shares of profit and wages in corporate income, both earned their rightful share according to their "marginal productivity"-refuting, in a single stroke, socialism.
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Fisher translated the accounting distinction between capital and profit into "stock of wealth" and "flow of income." 88 Defining capital as a quantitative thing, The Nature of Capital and Income was an astonishing illustration of capitalism's potential reification of wealth. 89 For their part, corporations developed many competing corporate historiographies of industrial capital. 90 In terms of influence, the practical companion to Fisher's The Nature of Capital and Income was William Paton's Accounting Theory with Special from capital expended. Paton advocated historical cost accounting. Capital expended entered the accounts at present value. So did production inputs and overhead costs, with more costs subsequently "attaching" to products as they passed through the production process to final sale. In the accounts, income was thus realized from the past. Corporate income was "all-inclusive" of profits, wages, dividends, debt payments, and taxes, all measured against the original book value of capital and costs.
Corporate accounting was thus a backward looking historical practice, in pursuit of the full integration of the firm's internal operations and external transactions into a singular accounting "entity"-the corporation qua corporation. Paton, drawing inspiration from "natural" and "real" legal theories of corporate personality, then in currency, declared a corporation a "living organism." Brown announced in 1921 that GM sought long-run returns on investment "consistent with a sound growth of the business." In other words the "highest attainable rate of return on capital" in the short run did not motivate the corporation. 93 Neither the factories' physical infrastructure nor consumer demand could sustain it. GM announced the corporation's motivation to achieve, over the long run, a 20 percent ROI, while operating its plant at, on average, 80 percent capacity (20 percent less capacity than Carnegie). GM developed sales forecasts and capital budgets to enable its divisions to hit the preordained targets.
This would lead to the post-World War II accounting literature on "profit plan- ning" and "standard markup pricing." 94 After World War II, the decentralized, multidivisional, or M-form, corporation rose to prominence. Postwar central office managers employed ROI metrics to hold disparate operating divisionsaround the globe, as the multidivisional corporation went multinational-to account. 95 Profit, in other words, was now a bureaucratic phenomenon. Market prices were often of subordinate interest in its calculation.
GM thus developed a clearly defined corporate profit motive. Or, as Talcott
Parsons explained in a 1942 article on "The Motivation of Economic Activities," profit had become "an institutionally defined goal" rather "than a motive." irrelevant accountancy"-was destroying national wealth. If "we allow ourselves to be disobedient to the test of an accountant's profit," Keynes wrote, "we have begun to change our civilization." 99 Keynes did not believe in the supply-side phenomenon of an individual profit motive. To him, capitalists were not profit motivated but rather skittish adherents to their "liquidity preference"-hoarders of capital in its money form, rather than expenders of it in fixed form. 100 It was aggregate demand that called forth a long-term commitment to industrial production.
In the United States, in the postwar decades Keynesian economics justified the progressive taxation of corporate income. Sustaining aggregate demand, wealth circulated through the new pathways of national income accounts, themselves modeled after corporate income accounts. 101 More than that, the prior existence of ROI made the twentieth-century state fiscalization of corporations possible. In the nineteenth century, states mostly taxed property and commerce (especially foreign commerce through the tariff).
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Taxing income was difficult. During the American Civil War, for instance, the federal government's income tax was an administrative disaster. 103 The Sixteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1913) constitutionalized a federal income tax, which would include from the beginning a corporate income taxan "entity" tax distinct from personal taxes on shareholder dividends. 104 The In- Rockefeller were still unique in their obsessive concern for the operating ratio.
Only in the twentieth century, with ROI, did profit become a uniform and universal business metric. Yet, on the other hand, in the short run, corporate managers enjoyed great scope of action to pursue what the transaction-cost economist Oliver Williamson in 1963 referred to as "discretionary" or "nonprofit" goals. 112 The representative The American Business Creed (1956), coauthored by four prominent Keynesian economists, referred to management's "sphere of unhampered discretion and authority which is not merely derivative from the property rights of owners." For "stockholders" had "no special priority; they are entitled to a fair return on their investment, but profits above a 'fair' level are an economic sin." 113 Indeed, in corporate law, the "business judgment rule" granted twentieth-century corporate managers and directors wide discretion to deploy corporate treasuries as they saw fit. With ownership dispersed and shareholders passive managers were in the corporate saddle. They held power "in trust" for the "paramount interests of the community." 117 As another foundational text, The Corporation in Modern Society (1961), explained, "The great corporations," had become "political systems in which their market, social, and political influence go far beyond their functional efficiency in the economy." 118 In this context, postwar discussions of corporate profit abounded with qualifiers-"fair profit," "sound profit," "excessive profit," "some profit" "satisfactory profit," "minimum acceptable level of profit," "required profit," not to mention "profit control," "profit shifting" and "profit smoothing." Of course, all the more paradoxical was that by historical standards in this period profit rates, however calculated, were remarkably high. 119 And so, in an era of high profits, only decades after its very discovery, man's profit motive appeared to be in eclipse.
An entire new academic literature explored the new managerial mind-set, seeking to explain "the firm's failure to seek to maximize short-run profits." 120 Among midlevel corporate managers, one economist speculated that, "profit has approximately the same significance as one's golf score." Another wondered if the very notion of "profit maximization" was a "vestigial remnant from an earlier fullblooded capitalism." 121 Descriptions of corporate managerial motives now came in lists, pluralities of objectives and goals, with profit sometimes nowhere to be found. Salary, security, power, status, prestige, and professional competence often rose to the top. 122 Or, rather than a short-run "profit-maximizer," the corporation, according to Herbert Simon, was a long-run "profit-satisficer." It sought to earn satisfactory profits within a given set of constraints. This included a temporal constraint-to make profits in the long run. 123 Giving that larger constraint, subsidiary constraints can be added to the list. In other words, ROI and historical cost accounting provided plenty of "organizational slack," so long as managers maintained the capital stock, assuring the continued growth and expansion of corporate revenue. Multiphasic Personality Inventory (1939) chief among them, was widespread. Inside corporations there was as much talk of adjustments and maladjustments, to both production schedules and personalities, as there was of profits and losses. 132 ROI, in the end, was an object not of "maximization," or even "satisfaction," but rather of the "integration" of the corporation qua corporation-precisely the theme, as it were, of corporate human relations, corporate historical cost accounting, and postwar legal theories of "real" corporate personality. 
RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY
In 2006 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which was established in 1973, defined a "mark-to-market," or "fair value," accounting as one that captured "the amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction." 138 This was an accounting seemingly removed from the discretion of cor-porate managers. As rate of return on equity (ROE) calculations replaced ROI, accounts increasingly began to narrate market histories of finance capital, in which time was both reversed and compressed. Rather than the past, established by bureaucratic historical cost accounting, market prices, putatively reflecting all known information about the future, increasingly anchored present profit calculations. As future valuations instantaneously began to revise the present, once again short-term time pressure pushed the nonprofit out of the forprofit corporation. In the wake of deindustrialization, as capital increasingly took financial forms, the "profit-maximizing" corporation was born.
Before ROE could begin to displace ROI, first a twentieth-century generation The decision the CEO faced was whether to reinvest in the two mills-which compared with East Asian producers were old and obsolete. Roderick had been putting off capital expenditures, for a telling reason. ROI, as a managerial profit metric, had a perverse incentive. 140 As Du Pont had realized a century before, a high ROI could result from selling a product at a modest operating ratio, produced in an inexpensive plant. One way to profit from an inexpensive plant was to run it into the ground, holding back from reinvestment retained earnings and depreciation allowances-in other words magnifying an ROI calculation by correlating an operating ratio to a diminished "permanent investment." The American steel industry did exactly this, achieving rather high ROI margins during the mid-1970s, before hitting a wall with this strategy in the late 1970s. 141 The union in a sense was right. Given the existence of a positive operating ratio, however slight, and given the depreciated book value of the plant, the Ohio Works was profitable. Or at least, from the perspective of ROI-a metric that the union did not enjoy the prerogative to calculate itself-the mill was even more profitable than the operating ratio let on.
Roderick did not see it is this way and the question is why. The most obvious answer is that there is no reason to invest in a steel mill with a months long time cates complained that historical cost accounting was simply the manager's selfinterested history of capital, prone to profit smoothing and the sentimental treatment of profit-seeking capital as communal wealth. Mark-to-market was said to offer a more transparent financial snapshot-ROE became a market history of finance capital, compressed into a single price that reflected all known information about the future. Indeed, as a metric of corporate success, increasingly stock prices displaced rates of return, however calculated. According to agency theory, financial markets, unlike managerial "profit plans," were inherently more efficient. 154. The concern then was about watered stock. Previts and Merino, History of Accountancy, chaps. 6-7. 155. By 2000, in the US nonfinancial corporations earned as much as 40 percent of their income from financial transactions, compared with 10 percent in the 1960s. Meanwhile, the profit take of the financial sector grew larger than the productive sector, despite the financial sector's relatively smaller share of asset values (since finance generated profits through debt-financing). Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis, chap. 2.
Trade. Futures, options, and swaps derive their value from some conditional variable in the future. Historical cost frameworks, focused on realization, cannot account for their value over time-let alone make use of the increasingly sophisticated mathematical models employed to price securitized assets. 156 In the 1980s during the LBO mania management consultants-to increase the value of acquired assets, under pressure of debt-pushed for mark-to-market valuations. 157 But mark-to-market truly emerged when, during the 1990s, financial and nonfinancial corporations alike began to engage in the manufacture so many new financial derivatives.
If there is one corporation that illustrated the harmony between shareholder value and mark-to-market it was Houston's Enron Corporation. Enron was a "Asset light" was a business model that Enron took to a fraudulent extreme, but it was nevertheless one that many US corporations were themselves increasingly pursuing. Fervently outsourcing production to low-wage areas of the globe, corporations sought to relinquish ownership and control over physical assets, as the intra-firm hierarchies of "entities" gave way to the cross-subsidiaries of "networks."
159 Certainly the largest and most powerful corporations, even nonfinancial ones, such as Wal-Mart, did not want to engage in actual manufacturing. Tables, table 2 .1, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. transactions after another, when a senior lawyer once pulled me aside to explain the key to the business model. Enron was neither an energy company nor a trading company, he explained; it was an accounting company. Depending on one's point of view, Enron was either creating the future "intangible assets" of the New Economy or massively looting wealth in the present. Meanwhile, Enron's human resources department featured performance review committees that rated employee teamwork according to the teams' generation of "unrealized income." The corporation valued future unrealized income over past effort and experience. At Enron, once it became apparent that recognized income would not in fact be realized, the stock price plummeted, the accounting frauds were revealed, and the corporation imploded. 162 There are striking parallels between the eras of the operating ratio and the era of mark-to-market. Both are eras of short-termism. Time pressure once again foregrounds the microeconomics of individual profit maximization. It also pushes the nonprofit from out of the for-profit corporation. Asset light in the books, forprofit corporations become more narrowly focused on profits, with-quite literally-little time left for anything else. "Organizational slack" is eliminated. Labor turnover accelerates. 163 Short-termism-through "outcome-orientated philanthropy," TIAA-CREF investment funds, or university endowments-invades the nonprofit. 164 Meanwhile, heightened economic inequality, as labor costs get squeezed, once again redistributes wealth through private philanthropy. The
Gates Foundation prods the global rich to give. Now, as then, the conflation of a plurality of institutional goals and objectives gives way to bifurcating organizational and normative poles. Even the biologically inspired binaries of egoism and altruism-under the guise of "competitive" versus "prosocial" behavior-have returned to academic prominence.
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There are major differences, one chief among them. Berle said of the modern corporation: "The capital is there, and so is capitalism. The waning factor is the capitalist." Today the capitalist is there, and so is capitalism. The waning factor is the capital. 166 Perhaps they did not account for the use of fixed capital, but the era of Carnegie and Rockefeller was nonetheless an era of capital accumulation. Debt fueled the 1980s leveraged buyout mania. Debt fueled the corporate stock buybacks that blew the 1990s New Economy bubble, as well as the obscene reliance on short-term debt-financing by global banks in the run up to the 2007-8 financial crisis. 167 Likewise, given mark-to-market's transaction-based character, aspects of the era of income and outgo have returned in new form. Debt, as then, prods concern for profitability. The urge to inflate balance sheet profits-recognized, if not realized-through securitization, not to mention the hiding of liabilities offbalance sheet in special-purpose entities, as Enron did, is apparent. Global banks howl against new regulations that would increase their equity (their capital) to higher than 3 percent of their assets. 168 Instead of running factories into the ground to inflate ROI, financial corporations finance themselves as much as possible through debt-that way slight upticks in market values can maximize an ROE calculation. In the switch from historical cost accounting to mark-tomarket, ROI to ROE, profit has been literally turned inside out. ROI was once a metric that recognized capital accumulation. Today ROE serves to eliminate the need for capital. Profit maximization has introduced the specter, and spectacle, of capitalism without capital.
Further, with mark-to-market, the instantaneous updating of assets and liabilities values on the balance sheet, the "event" has returned. Events cannot be smoothed out in the quarterly and yearly managerial accounts. Temporality in economic life becomes more lumpy. Tweets can roil derivatives markets. The goal of sophisticated mathematical asset value modeling in global banks, for instance, is to exclude certain classes of events from "value-at-risk models"-eliminating risk, justifying debt-financing, further reducing the need for capital. When those events-the 1998 Russian sovereign default, the 2007 collapse of US housing prices-occur (not to mention unpredictably correlate in nonlinear fashion), the balance sheets of highly leveraged corporations simply blow up. 169 Mark-to-market compresses the future onto the present, with respect to profit and loss, boom, and bust.
The global financial crisis of 2007-9 was a setback for the mark-to-market movement. 170 The corporate personalities-the "low profit" corporation, the "benefit corporation"-seek to reintegrate the for profit and the nonprofit. They lurk only at the margins. 172 For now, like some black hole energized by a supernova of debt, the balance sheet collapses into profit-liquidating capital, devouring our wealth. 
